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Introduction
On December 17, 1992, U.S. President George Bush signed the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At the same time, Canadian
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, in Ottawa, and Mexican President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari, in Mexico City, also signed the agreement. With three
flourishes of pens in three capitals, the goal of establishing one of the
world's largest "free trade areas" took a significant step towards becoming
reality.
The next step belonged to the United States Congress. After a long
and contentious debate, centering on NAFTA's implications for the econ-
omy, unemployment, and the environment, Congress passed NAFTA's
implementing legislation, and President Bill Clinton signed it into law.
Waiting in the wings, however, is an issue that transcends supply and
demand, with implications that cannot be measured in econometric statis-
tics. This debate will play out in the U.S. judiciary. The focal point: a
single NAFTA chapter, largely overlooked by the popular media, that
allows NAFTA countries to settle certain trade disputes before binational
panels selected from pools appointed by each country's government. The
issue: Whether the panel system, by supplanting American courts, violates
Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
Congress previously confronted the constitutionality of binational dis-
pute resolution when it enacted a similar provision as part of the 1988
trade agreement between the United States and Canada.' Despite expres-
* J.D., Stanford Law School. I would like to thank Professor John Barton of
Stanford Law School for his guidance and comments on previous drafts. I would also
like to thankJohn GlazerJ.D., Stanford Law School, for engaging me in several debates
on the judicial function and separation of powers. Thanks also to Professor William
Cohen of Stanford Law School and to the staff of the Comell International LawJournaL
Finally, thanks to Sandra Chavez, J.D., Stanford Law School, for last-minute long-
distance research assistance and for shark sandwiches. Of course, the views expressed
herein are my own, and I accept full responsibility for any errors.
I am actually a proponent of free trade in general and NAFTA in particular. I write
mainly to express my concern that we have not adequately assessed the constitutional
implications nor prepared for the inevitable confrontation between a national
Constitution and an increasingly transnational world.
1. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281
[hereinafter U.S.-Can. FTA]. See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
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sing serious misgivings, Congress resolved its doubts in favor of the plan
and ratified the agreement. 2 Nearly four years later, the panel system
received its first judicial test, but in a surprising forum: the European
Court of Justice. Asked whether an analogous dispute resolution system
between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European
Free Trade Area was compatible with the EEC Treaty, the Court answered:
No.3
While the European Court's decision obviously carries no direct prec-
edential weight in the United States, it reflects policy concerns that should
inform courts worldwide. International trade now goes beyond the cleri-
cal domain of customs officers and tariff tables, and embraces serious
social, political, and even constitutional concerns. Truly free trade, with
supervision by transnational institutions, entails hard choices about
national sovereignty and constitutional reform.
This article examines the constitutionality of NAFTA's binational dis-
pute resolution system under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Part I
describes the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism, while Part II sketches
the broad issues raised under Article III. Part III crosses the Atlantic to
review the European Court's decision in Re Draft Treaty on a European Eco-
nomic Area.4 Part IV assesses NAFTA's constitutionality, using the Euro-
pean decision to inform a detailed analysis of American Article III
jurisprudence, and concludes that NAFTA's binational panels violate Arti-
cle III. Part V discusses the implications of this violation and offers short
and long-term solutions.
I. Binational Dispute Resolution Under NAFFA
More than 150 years ago, Simon Bolivar, The Liberator, whose statue
stands outside this hall, spoke about an America united in heart, subject to
one law and guided by the torch of liberty. My friends, here in this hemi-
sphere, we are on the way to realizing Simon Bolivar's dream.
-President George Bush 5
A. Background
On December 17, 1992, U.S. President George Bush,6 Canadian Prime
2. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
3. Case 1/91, Re Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, 1 C.M.L.R. 245, 275
(1992) [hereinafter Draft Treaty 1].
4. 1d.
5. Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact Signed in 3 Capitals, N.Y. TrmEs, Dec. 18, 1992, at D1
(statement by President Bush upon signing the North American Free Trade Agreement
in the main hall of the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C.).
6. President Bill Clinton took office on January 20, 1993. Subsequently, the
NAFTA parties concluded ancillary agreements on environmental and labor issues. See
Keith Bradsher, 3 Nations Resolve Issues Holding Up Trade Pact Vote, N.Y. Timus, Aug. 14,
1993, at Al. After some last-minute tinkering to appease certain affected industries, see
Carolyn Lochhead, Special Deals Helped Clinton Win on NAFTA, S.F. CmRON., Nov. 18,
1993, at A4, the U.S. House of Representatives passed NAFTA's implementing legisla-
tion on November 17, 1993. Marc Sandalow, House Approves NAF'TA: Tough Day of
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Minister Brian Mulroney,7 and Mexican President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).8
The agreement cites several lofty goals, such as "strengthen[ing] the spe-
cial bonds of friendship and cooperation among [the NAFTA] nations,"
and "creat[ing] new employment opportunities and improv[ing] working
conditions and living standards in their respective territories."9 Among
other things, NAFTA will phase out all tariffs on goods moving between its
member countries, 10 facilitate the flow of services" and investment,12 and
establish certain standards for intellectual property laws.' 3 With these
measures, NAFTA will create one of the world's largest free trade areas,
covering over 369 million people and $ 5,351 billion of gross domestic
product.14
Such multinational free trade areas and other sorts of trading blocs
have become popular in recent years. 15 However, international trading
partners seek not only free trade, but "fair" trade as well. Thus, a number
of domestic and international remedies have evolved to define and pro-
mote fairness. Two of the most significant remedies are antidumping and
Debate Ends with 234-to-200 Victmy, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 1993, at Al. The Senate passed
NAFTA on November 20, see Clinton Wins on Trade Pact: Senate Passes Gun Bil, NAFTA,
S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al, and President Clinton signed NAFTA into law on
December 8, 1993. Marc Sandalow, Clinton Signs NAFTA, Looks Ahead to GATT, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 9, 1993, at A8. As had been expected, the Mexican Senate quickly
approved NAFTA shortly after it passed the U.S. Congress. With 56-2 Vote, Mexican
Lawmakers Give Easy Final Approval to NAFTA, LA TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993, at A6.
7. Mulroney announced his resignation on February 24, 1993. Clyde H. Farns-
worth, Canada's Leader Quitting. Mulroneys Popularity Was at Record Low in Polls, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 25, 1993, at Al. Nonetheless, the Canadian Parliament ratified NAFTA,
contingent upon approval by the U.S. Congress. See Steven Greenhouse, Judge Gives
Order that May Delay Trade Pac4 N.Y. TAEs, July 1, 1993, at D1. Canada's new Liberal
Party government approved NAF1A after securing a Mexican and American agreement
to negotiate uniform dumping and subsidies codes over the next two years. John
Urquhart & Rosanna Tamburri, Canada Clears NAFTA, Claims Improvements: Liberal Party
Says It Won Changes to Trade Pact on Unfair Pridng Codes, WALL ST.J., Dec. 3, 1993, at A2.
8. Bradsher, supra note 5.
9. North American Free Trade Agreement: Final Text, Dec. 17,1992, pmbl. (CCH
Int'l, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
10. Id. Annex 302.2 § 1. The maximum phase-out period is 15 years, but the agree-
ment terminates some tariffs immediately. Id.
11. Id. arts. 1201-1213.
12. Id. arts. 1104-1114.
13. Id. arts. 1701-1721.
14. By the Numbers, WAx ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at R12 (compiled by Thomas E.
Weber). Note: gross domestic product is based on 1991 amounts, expressed in con-
stant 1985 U.S. dollars. Id.
15. See Tim Carrington, Getting Together The Proliferation of Trade Blocs Scares Some
Economists, But So Far the Growth is Benign, WALL ST.J., Sept. 24, 1992, at R23. Two prime
examples are the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area,
which are discussed infra at notes 118-21 and accompanying text. Other examples
include Anzcerta (Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agree-
ment), Caricom (Caribbean Common Market) and Ecowas (Economic Community of
West African States). Carrington, supra, at R23.
The United States and Israel entered into a free trade agreement in 1985. See gener-
ally United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement Implementation Act of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-47, 99 Stat. 82 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988)).
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countervailing duty laws.16
As the name implies, antidumping laws seek to prevent exporters
from "dumping" products on other countries at unfairly low prices. 17 In
the classic case, an exporter subsidizes these cheap sales with high prices
in its home country. Dumping is thus a trade-law cousin to the antitrust
doctrine of predatory pricing.' 8 Under U.S. law, the offense of dumping
consists of two elements: (1) an export to the U.S. priced at "less than its
fair value,"19 with (2) a resulting material injury or threat thereof to an
American industry.20 The penalty is a tariff designed to restore the export
price to fair value.2 '
Countervailing duty laws are a variation on the same theme.22 These
laws also seek to prevent imports at unfairly low prices. This time, how-
ever, the offending exporter's home country finances the practice with
some sort of subsidy, e.g., a tax rebate. As with antidumping, a counter-
vailing duty action requires two elements: (1) a "bounty or grant"
bestowed by an exporter's government,23 causing (2) injury to an Ameri-
can industry.24 The penalty assessed is a tariff intended to offset or "coun-
tervail" the government subsidy.25
16. The remainder of this section describes antidumping and countervailing duty
provisions under U.S. law, in keeping with my focus on the U.S. Constitution. Canada
and Mexico possess roughly similar trade remedies.
17. For a more detailed discussion of antidumping laws, see JOHN H. BARTON &
BART S. FisHrR, INT'rNA oNAL . TRADE AND INvEsrmENr. REGULATING INTERNATiONAL
Busn.mss 273-333 (1986).
18. Compare the above discussion of dumping with the description of predatory
pricing in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-93
(1986).
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1988). Fair value is defined by reference either to prices
in the exporter's home market, see id. §§ 1677a-1677b (1988), or to "constructed value,"
which includes materials and production costs plus allowances for overhead and profit,
see id. § 1677b(e) (1) (1988).
20. Id. § 1673(2) (1988). The materiality of an injury is based on the volume of
affected imports, the impact on U.S. prices and domestic producers, and other relevant
factors. See id. § 1677(7) (A)-(B) (1988). Detailed guidance on the materiality calculus
appears in id. § 1677(7) (C) (1988 & Supp. 1991 & Supp. 1992).
21. Id. § 1673 (1988).
22. See generally BARTON & FisHmR, supra note 17, at 335-92. For a critical analysis of
countervailing duties, see E. Kwaku Andoh, Countervailing Duties in a Not Quite Perfect
World: An Economic Analysis, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1515 (1992).
23. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1) (1988). The term "bounty or grant" appears in id.
§§ 1303(a)(1), 1677(5) (1988).
24. Id. § 1671 (a) (2) (1988). Note that the injury requirement only applies to coun-
tries that have signed the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. See id.
§ 1671(a) (1), (b) (1988). For actions against nonsigning countries, the existence of a
bounty or grant is sufficient, unless the goods in question were previously duty-free. Id.
§ 1303(a)-(b) (1988).
25. Id. § 1671(a) (1988). Imposition of a tariff is mandatory if the subsidy and
injury requirements are met. See iti (duty "shall be imposed") (emphasis added).
While this concept seems straightforward, the actual calculation of a countervailing
duty can be quite complex. See, eg., BARTON & FIsHER, supra note 17, at 368-74 (also
citing Re Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determinations Concerning Certain Steel
Products Originating in Belgium, 2 C.M.L.R. 550 (1982) as example).
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Prior to the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, antidumping and
countervailing duty actions in the U.S. followed similar procedural paths.
First, a U.S. firm would petition the Commerce Department, alleging that
it was being harmed by a foreign competitor's dumping or subsidy.26 The
Commerce Department would then make a preliminary determination on
the issue of less-than-fair-value pricing or bounty-or-grant subsidies, as
applicable. 27 Meanwhile, the International Trade Commission (ITC), an
independent federal agency, would make a preliminary determination of
industry injury.28 If both findings were affirmative, the two agencies
would make final determinations.29 At each step of this process, the Com-
merce Department and the ITC observed strict time constraints.30
Certain affected American and foreign firms had standing to appear
before the Commerce Department and the ITC in these proceedings.31
Those firms could also appeal final determinations to the Court of Inter-
national Trade,32 with a second round of appeals to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.33
B. The Binational Panel System
During the negotiations for NAFTA's predecessor, the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, Canada made no secret of its dissatisfaction with U.S.
antidumping and subsidy laws. The Canadians believed that the adminis-
tering agencies were influenced by domestic political considerations, with
unfair results for Canadian firms.34 This issue became a major sticking
point in the bargaining process.3 5 Canadian officials sought substantive
26. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979 § 5,93 Stat. 1381, 1383-84 amended by Pub. L.
97-197 § 1(c) (6), 96 Stat. 115 (1982), Pub. L. 97-377, title I, § 122, 96 Stat. 1913 (1982),
reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2171 note (1988).
27. Id. § 1671b(b) (1988) (countervailing duties); id. § 1673b(b) (1988) (antidump-
ing). The Commerce Department performs a preliminary overall screening before
sending petitions to the International Trade Commission for determination of material
injury. Id. §§ 1671a(c), 1673a(c) (1988).
28. Id. § 1671b(a) (1988) (countervailing duties); id, § 1673b(a) (1988)
(antidumping).
29. Id. § 1671d(a)-(b) (1988) (countervailing duties); id. § 1673d(a)-(b) (1988)
(antidumping).
30. See id. §§ 1671a(c), 1671b(a)-(c), 1671d(a)-(b), 1673a(c), 1673b(a)-(c),
1673d(a)-(b) (1988). For handy flowcharts, see BARTON & FiSHER, supra note 17, at 287
fig. 5-2 (antidumping), 337 fig. 6-1 (countervailing duties).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1677c(a) (1988). These "interested parties" include: foreign manu-
facturers and importers; governments of exporting countries; domestic manufacturers,
wholesalers, and importers; and affected U.S. labor unions and trade associations. Id.
§ 1677(9) (1988).
32. Id. § 1516a(a) (1988).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (5) (1988).
34. UNrrED STATES-CANADA FRE_-TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION AcT OF 1988,
S. RE'. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. 2395,
2464 (additional views by Senators Dennis Deconcini and Howell T. Heflin).
35. For discussion of some of the problems encountered, which included Canadian
officials walking out on the negotiations at one point, see Peter Huston, Note,
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Dispute Settlement Under the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement: Is the Process Constitutional?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 529, 549 n.168
(1990).
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changes in American law,36 or, alternatively, a switch to common U.S.-
Canadian laws interpreted by a common tribunal.37 Neither approach was
acceptable to the Americans.38
American and Canadian negotiators crafted a unique compromise,3 9
creating two new institutions: "binational panels" to review final
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations by domestic agen-
cies, and "extraordinary challenge committees" to review panel decisions.
A U.S. official described these provisions as the "linchpin" of the agree-
ment.4° When NAFICA added Mexico to the free-trade matrix, it carried
forward and adapted the two U.S.-Canadian institutions.
1. NAFrA Institutions
Each of the three NAFITA nations is to select at least twenty-five candidates
for membership on binational panels.4 1 The agreement expresses a pref-
erence for sitting or retired judges as panelists. 42 Each panel is to consist
of five members: two selected by each of the two countries involved in a
given dispute, with the final panelist selected by agreement between the
two countries or by lot.43
NAFTA also creates extraordinary challenge committees to review cer-
tain panel decisions. Each NAFTA country selects five sitting or retired
judges as potential committee members.44 From this roster, the two
opposing countries in a dispute select a committee of three.45 After each
opponent selects one member, the two countries draw lots to determine
which side gets to choose the pivotal third member.46
2. NAFTA Procedures
Under NAFrA, the United States' substantive antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws remain unchanged, as do its procedures for initial deter-
36. The Canadians had sought "an exemption from our countervailing duty law and
our antidumping law, or at least to have a rewrite of those laws." United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiiay on the Constitutionality
of Establishing a Binational Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and CountervailingDuty
Cases, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1988) (statement of Ambassador Alan F. Holmer, Dep-
uty U.S. Trade Representative) [hereinafter Hearing].
37. A Disgruntled Canadian: Former Trade Negotiator Gordon Ritchie Warns that the US.-
Canada Deal Is in Jeopardy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at R18 (interview with Canada's
former deputy chief negotiator for the U.S.-Canada trade pact).
38. See Hearing, supra note 36, at 122 (statement of Professor Andreas Lowenfeld,
New York University).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 91 (remarks byJohn 0. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General).
41. NAFrA, supra note 9, Annex 1901.2 § 1.
42. Id.
43. Id. Annex 1901.2 §§ 2-3. Each country can exercise four peremptory challenges
to its counterpart's choices. Id. Annex 1901.2 § 2. A majority of the five panelists must
be lawyers. Id.
44. Id. Annex 1904.13 § 1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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minations by executive agencies.47 At that point, however, NAFrA's
unique dispute-settlement institutions take over.48
Once the Commerce Department or the ITC issues a final determina-
tion, an interested participant from either country has thirty days to
request review by a NAFTA panel.4 9 Upon such a request, the binational
panel replaces traditional judicial review.50 While detailed procedures for
panel review are not yet available, NAFTA sketches some broad con-
tours.51 The panel obtains the administrative record from the investigat-
ing agency.52 A representative of that agency can appear before the
panel.53 Interested parties who would have had standing to appear in a
traditional appeal can submit briefs and present oral arguments. 54
NAFTA also provides for future rules governing filing and service, confer-
ences, motions, requests for rehearing, and the like, "based, where appro-
priate, upon judicial rules of appellate procedure."55
Based on the above proceeding, the panel assesses the agency deter-
mination for compliance with U.S. substantive law, including judicial
precedents, using the same legal principles that a U.S. court would
apply.56 The panel then decides whether to uphold the agency's action or
to remand the proceeding "for action not inconsistent with the panel's
decision."57 The decision is by majority vote of the five panelists, with the
panel providing a written opinion along with concurring and dissenting
opinions.58 This decision is binding with respect to the parties and the
particular matter before the panel.59 While panel decisions have no for-
mal precedential effect, the implementing statute allows U.S. courts to
47. Id. art. 1902. Each NAFTA country can still amend these laws, id., but amend-
ments are subject to a special review process. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanyirig
text.
48. This section discusses the panel process from a U.S. perspective. Analogous
procedures cover Canada and Mexico.
49. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1904 §§ 2, 4. Technically, the request is made by the
participant's country. See id. However, the United States, Canada and Mexico have
committed to make such a request on behalf of any person who would have had stand-
ing to commence domestic procedures forjudicial review. Id. art. 1904 § 5.
50. Id art. 1904 §§ 1, 11.
51. See id. art. 1904 § 14. The deadline for the NAFTA parties to adopt formal rules
of procedure is January 1, 1994. Id. The Commerce Department is to publish these
rules in the Federal Register as they become available. See North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 405, 107 Stat. 2057, 2137-38
(1993). To date, the Commerce Department has published procedural rules for com-
mencing panel review and rules governing proprietary information and protective
orders. See Panel Review Under Article 1904 of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, 59 Fed. Reg. 228 (1994) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 356).
52. See id.
53. Id. art. 1904 § 7.
54. See id. art. 1904 §§ 7, 14.
55. Id. art. 1904 § 14.
56. Id. art. 1904 § 2. Article 1911 defines "general legal principles" to include
"standing, due process, rules of statutory construction, mootaess and exhaustion of
administrative remedies." Id. art. 1911.
57. Id. art. 1904 § 8.
58. Id. Annex 1901.2 § 5.
59. Id. art. 1904 § 9.
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consider such decisions in their own deliberations.6 °
NAFTA provides for a limited right of appeal from panel decisions.
Appeals are available in the following circumstances: (1) gross miscon-
duct, bias, serious conflict of interest, or other material misconduct on the
part of a panelist; (2) a serious departure from a fundamental rule of pro-
cedure; or (3) when a panel "manifestly exceed[s] its powers, authority, or
jurisdiction."61 However, participants cannot appeal to U.S. courts; 62
rather, they must bring their appeal before an extraordinary challenge
committee.6 3 The committee then affirms the panel decision or vacates it
for remand to a new panel.64 As with panel decisions, committee rulings
are binding with respect to the matter and parties involved.65
3. Amendments to Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws
In addition to rendering decisions under existing trade laws, NAFrA's
binational panels play a special role in the statutory amendment process.
The U.S. has agreed to notify Canada and Mexico of impending amend-
ments to its antidumping and countervailing duty laws if those amend-
ments apply to either NAFTA partner. 66 Upon such notice, the affected
country can ask that a binational panel review the amendment in question
for compatibility with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 67 the international antidumping and subsidies codes,68 or
NAFTA itself.69 The panel then issues a declaratory opinion on these
60. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (3) (Supp. 1993). The related Senate Report explains:
"A U.S. court should view panel decisions in the same fashion as it would view state-
ments of respected commentators on the application of U.S. law." S. REP. No. 509,
Supra note 34, at 34, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2429. NAFTA's implementing
legislation carries forward this provision. See North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 411(2), 107 Stat. 2057, 2141 (1993).
61. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1904 § 13. Such actions must have "materially
affected the panel's decision and threaten[ed] the integrity of the binational review
process." Id.
62. See id. art. 1904 § 11.
63. Id. art. 1904 § 13.
64. Id. Annex 1904.13 § 3.
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 1902 § 2(c). Canada and Mexico owe reciprocal obligations to the
United States. Amendments are presumed not to apply within the NAFTA area unless
they explicitly specify otherwise. Id. art. 1902 § 2(a).
67. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade establishes basic rules for its sig-
natories' domestic trade laws, and also constitutes the foundation for multilateral trade
agreements. For background on GATT, see JoHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAw OF GATT (1969). Article VI of GATT governs antidumping and countervailing
duties. See General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade art. VI, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, A23, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 212.
68. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 4924, 1186 U.N.T.S. 2, 4 (antidumping);
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 518, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204,
206 (subsidies).
69. NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 1902 § 2(d), 1903 § 1(a). The panel also determines
whether the "amendment has the function and effect of overturning a prior [panel]
decision." Id. art. 1903 § 1(b).
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issues.70 If the panel declares that the amendment does not conform with
the above criteria, the parties can negotiate possible modifications for
ninety daysZ 1 If modifications are not made within nine months of the
end of the consultation period, the affected party can retaliate by amend-
ing its own law or by terminating NAFTA.72
4. The Spectre of Article LI
The NAFrA institutions and procedures described above impose two sig-
nificant and unprecedented changes on the American judiciary. First,
NAFTA removes certain cases from the jurisdiction of federal courts and
places those cases within a new dispute resolution mechanism. At the
same time, NAFIA envisions a significant role for federal judges as panel
and challenge committee members.
The binational panel scheme gives NAFTA a constitutional dimen-
sion. While the President and Congress clearly have the constitutional
power to negotiate and ratify free trade agreements such as NAFTA, they
do not have a free hand in modifying the federal judiciary. Article ImI of
the U.S. Constitution governs the judicial function and imposes strict lim-
its on what the legislative and executive branches can do in this regard. As
a result, one cannot evaluate the desirability of NAFI'A or of its methods
for dispute resolution without first assessing their constitutionality.
H. Article MI: A Mystery Wrapped in an Enigma
Legislative courts
Are but agencies in drag,
Glidden is but paint.
-Professor Kenneth Karst 73
Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests "[t]he judicial Power of the United
States... in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may... establish."74 In addition to laying out the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, Article III issues three clear commands to Congress. Sec-
tion 1 provides federal judges with life tenure "during good Behaviour,"
and requires that each judge's compensation "shall not be diminished
during [his or her] Continuance in Office." 75 Section 2 limits federal juris-
diction to "Cases" and "Controversies."76
These safeguards serve two purposes. The first is institutional, fur-
thering the goal of separation of powers. By guaranteeing the tenure and
70. See id. art. 1903 § 1. Detailed procedures for the panel's review appear in an
annex to the agreement. See id. Annex 1903.2.
71. Id. art. 1903 § 3(a).
72. Id. art. 1903 § 3(b).
73. Kenneth Karst, Untitled Poem, in FederalJurisdidion Haikt; 32 STAN. L. Rv. 229,
230 (1979) (referring to Glidden v. Zdanok Co., 370 U.S. 530 (1982)). For further
discussion of Glidden, see infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
74. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
75. Id.
76. Id. §2.
Cornell International Law Journal
compensation of federal judges, the Framers sought to prevent Congress
from using the threat of discharge or diminished compensation to influ-
ence the judiciary.77 Meanwhile, the cases-and-controversies restriction
takes a different approach to the same end. By confining the judicial
power to live disputes, this provision prevents the judicial branch from
taking on an advisory or quasi-legislative role.78
The second purpose of Article I comes at the level of individual citi-
zens. By ensuring an independent judiciary, Article III assures private liti-
gants of an impartial forum for the adjudication and protection of their
rights. 79
Despite its relatively clear provisions and straightforward goals, Article
I is one of the most complex areas of American constitutional law, an
area full of "frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents."80
While Article I governs "the" judicial power of the United States and
77. Alexander Hamilton explained the provision for life tenure as follows:
If, then, the courts ofjustice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a
strong argument for the permanent tenure ofjudicial offices, since nothing will
contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in judges which must be
essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464,469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
He then offered a similar rationale for Article III's compensation clause: "Next to
permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges
than a fixed provision for their support .... In the general course of human nature, a
power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his wilL" THE FEDERAsr No. 79, at
472, 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also THE DECLAATION
OF INDEPENDENcE para. 10 (U.S. 1776) (lamenting that King George III "has made
judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries.").
78. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,581-82 (1962) (plurality opinion).
79. See ThE F-DERAusr No. 78, supra note 77, at 470:
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the indepen-
dence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occa-
sional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the
injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial
laws.
While Article I's global and individual goals normally coincide, they sometimes con-
flict. For example, a private litigant may expressly waive, or fail to raise, his objection to
the use of a non-Article HI forum in a given dispute. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 535-37 (1962) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court held that a petitioner's
failure to raise an Article III issue at trial was not fatal to his claim. The court reasoned
that, just as private parties cannot waive a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, they can-
not waive Article III's structural goals. I& at 535-36.
Hamilton also cited a third, more pragmatic goal of the tenure and compensation
clauses by observing that these provisions would attract the highest quality judicial can-
didates. THE FEDERAisTr No. 78, supra note 77, at 471-72. The Supreme Court recently
noted that the life tenure provision served a fourth goal, judicial individualism, as well.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 n.10 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
80. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) (quoting
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
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apparently intends to be all-encompassing,8 ' the Supreme Court has, in
certain limited cases, allowed Congress to establish "courts" under Article I
that are not subject to Article I constraints.8 2 The first such case was
American Insurance Co. v. Canter,8 3 in which the Supreme Court allowed
tribunals in the then-territory of Florida to hear certain federal cases, even
though territorial judges served four-year terms as opposed to life ten-
ure.8 4 Since then, the concept of Article I tribunals has grown to include
courts in the District of Columbia,8 5 the U.S. Tax Court,8 6 and military
courts-martial.8 7 The doctrine has also been used, by analogy, to justify an
expanded role for magistrates in the U.S. district courts.88
As a result, the key issue in an Article m case is whether a given forum
is exercising "the judicial Power of the United States," and therefore must
possess the attributes of life tenure, non-diminishable compensation, and
case-and-controversy adjudication, or whether that forum is merely carry-
ing out congressional powers under Article 1.89 In Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,90 a plurality of the Supreme Court
attempted to lay down a bright-line test for resolving this issue.
As part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,91 Congress established
81. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2654 (1991) (Scalia,J., concurring
in part and concurring in thejudgment): "Article III begins 'The judicial Power of the
United States'-not 'Some ofthejudicial Power of the United States' or even 'Most of the
judicial Power of the United States'...."
82. While Article I makes no explicit reference to such courts, the textual support
for this congressional power comes from Article I's Necessary and Proper clause. Glid-
den Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543-44 (1962) (plurality opinion).
83. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.).
84. Id. at 546. Strictly speaking, territorial courts are Article lV courts, arising
under the congressional power to legislate for the territories. See Freytag v. Commis-
sioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2656-57 (1991) (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). In the interest of minimizing the confusion surrounding Article III, I
will use the term "Article I tribunals" generically to refer to all adjudicative bodies not
established under Article III.
85. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973) (allowing local criminal
cases in the District to be tried before non-Article III judges).
86. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2642, 2644-46 (1991). While
Freytag involved the Constitution's Appointments Clause, it may represent the height of
judicial flexibility, and complexity, in Article III interpretation. The majority held that
the Tax Court, as a "court of law," could appoint special trial judges under the Appoint-
ments Clause of Article I, section 2, despite acknowledging that "Article I courts are
the only courts of law mentioned in the Constitution." Id. at 2644-46.
87. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
88. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991) (allowing magistrates in
criminal cases to conduct voir dire if defendant consents).
89. Note the crucial distinction between congressional power to create Article I
tribunals and the related issue of congressional power over federal court jurisdiction
under Article III. Here, the issue is not whether Congress can or must entrust certain
cases to federal adjudication, but which federal forum can hear those cases once Con-
gress consigns them to federal jurisdiction.
90. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
91. Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549 (codified at scattered sections of 2,5,7, 11, 12,
15, 17-20, 22, 28, 29, 31, 33, 40-43, 45, 46, 48, and 49 U.S.C.).
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a system of bankruptcy courts as adjuncts to the U.S. district courts.9 2
Judges in these courts serve 14-year terms, with salaries subject to congres-
sional adjustment.93 Congress endowed bankruptcy judges with a wide
array of quasijudicial powers, including the ability to conduct jury trials
and to issue declaratory judgments, writs of habeas corpus, and any other
necessary orders.9 4 The Act also authorized bankruptcy courts to hear
state law claims related to a debtor's estate in addition to straightforward
bankruptcy claims. 95
Northern Pipeline, a debtor in reorganization, sued Marathon Pipe
Line in bankruptcy court for breach of contract, among other state law
claims.9 6 Marathon sought to dismiss the suit, arguing that the bank-
ruptcy court did not possess Article III's tenure and compensation safe-
guards and thus could not entertain common law claims.97
The Supreme Court agreed and invalidated that aspect of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act. Four Justices, led by Justice Brennan, sought to rein-
vigorate the comprehensive and restrictive language of Article III, limiting
the exception for Article I tribunals to three relatively narrow situations:
territorial courts, courts-martial, and cases involving "public rights," that is,
suits against the U.S. government.98 Because the private common law
claims at issue clearly fell outside all three exceptions, and because the
bankruptcy courts did not satisfy Article III, the plurality dismissed North-
ern Pipeline's claims and invalidated the Act.9 9 Despite their rigid stance,
the four Justices were willing to lend some credence to pragmatic con-
cerns; they applied their decision prospectively, in order to protect previ-
ous litigants, and granted a brief stay to allow Congress to amend the
Bankruptcy Code.10 0 Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred, but
92. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53
(1982) (plurality opinion). The amendments resulted from a ten-year study. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 55.
95. Id. at 54. Litigants could appeal bankruptcy court decisions to special three-
judge panels, or to federal appellate courts. Id. at 55.
96. Id. at 56.
97. Id. at 56-57.
98. Id. at 57-74 (plurality opinion). The public rights exception is in part an out-
growth of the sovereign immunity doctrine. As the government must consent to be
sued, it can choose the forum where suit must be brought. For an excellent history of
the public rights doctrine, see Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65-71
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
99. Note, however, that even the plurality's view was not as rigid or narrow as it
asserted. The plurality opinion conceded that although bankruptcy cases were not suits
against the government, such cases "mky well be a 'public right'" outside of Article III
because they were benefits created by federal statute. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71
(plurality opinion).
100. Id. at 87-89 (plurality opinion). Congress eventually addressed the Court's deci-
sion in the Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-
353 § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 340-41 (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988)).
The Act allows district courts to review, using a de novo standard, certain "non-core"
matters decided in bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). For a brief history of
the congressional response to Northern Pipeline see PErR W. Low & JOHN CALVIN JEF-
VoL 27
1994 Constitutional Dimensions of NAFTA
declined to adopt the plurality's restrictive interpretation of Article HI.1°1
In a vigorous dissent, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Powell, criticized the majority's "gross oversimplification" of
Article rijurisprudence.10 2 Justice White proposed a more pragmatic bal-
ancing test under which the Court would weigh the judiciary's interest in
adhering to Article III against the congressional interest in departing from
that provision.' 0 3 Applying this test, Justice White concluded that Con-
gress's interest in overhauling the overburdened bankruptcy system justi-
fied its departure from Article III, which was limited to a highly specialized
body of law "likely to be of little interest to the political branches."10 4
As it turned out, the Northern Pipeline plurality's attempt to establish a
principled test never got off the ground, and Justice White's balancing
approach won the day. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,10 5
decided just four years after Northern Pipeline, a majority of the Court
upheld a provision of the Commodity Exchange Act that empowered the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to adjudicate a broker's
contract counterclaims in a customer's suit for reparations. The Court
adopted a three-factor test, weighing the extent to which Congress
intruded upon traditional judicial functions and jurisdiction, and the
nature and importance of the individual right being adjudicated, against
the pragmatic concerns motivating the congressional departure. 10 6
Two years after Schor, the United States and Canada entered into the
free trade agreement that presaged NAFrA. 0 7 As previously seen, the
U.S.-Canadian agreement also provided for binational dispute resolu-
tion.'0 8 Congress recognized that by removing antidumping and subsidies
cases from the federal courts and placing them in the new panel system, it
risked violating Article III. Thus, prior to enacting and codifying the U.S.-
Canadian agreement, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing to
assess its constitutionality. 10 9 Most participants believed that the govern-
uEs, JR, FEDERAL CoURrs AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 145 n.3 (2d ed.
1989).
101. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 93 (White, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 113-15 (White, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 115-18 (White, J., dissenting).
105. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
106. Id. at 851. The Court had set the stage for this approach with its 1985 decision
in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). In
Thomas, a majority upheld a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden-
ticide Act (FIFRA) which provided for binding arbitration of disputes among pesticide
registrants as to the value of data shared during the registration process. The Court
repudiated the formalistic test used by the plurality in Northern Pipeline, declaring "that
practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories
should inform application of Article III." Id. at 586.
107. See generally U.S.-Can. FTA, supra note 1.
108. See id. arts. 1901-1908.
109. See generally Hearing, supra note 36. In addition to evaluating the U.S.-Canadian
system under Article III, the Committee also discussed the related Due Process con-
cerns, and addressed the constitutionality of appointing panelists under the Appoint-
ments Clause. See, eg., id. at 142-59 (statement of Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, New
Cornell International Law Journal
mental interest in establishing the agreement outweighed individual trad-
ers' interests in judicial review, and that the-agreement would therefore
pass constitutional muster.1 1 0 However, the Committee was not able to
reach a conclusion.111 Despite a forceful protest by the Customs and
International Trade Bar Association, 112 and despite lingering doubts
among some congressmen,113 the free trade agreement became law on
September 19, 1988.114 The related statute did establish special proce-
dures for constitutional challenges to the panel system. 115
The panel issue thus lay dormant, awaiting a judicial test. With no
word yet from the U.S. courts, the U.S. negotiated and signed NAFTA,
York University) (addressing Appointments Clause); id. at 159-67 (addressing due
process).
110. See id at 83 n.4 (statement ofJohn 0. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral) ("There is no constitutional bar to the passage of legislation precluding the judi-
cial review of antidumping or countervailing duty tariff determinations... [b]ecause
individuals do not enjoy a vested constitutional 'right to import.'"); id. at 115 (state-
ment of Professor Harold H. Bruff, University of Texas at Austin) ("Under [Schor], I
think the FrA is clearly constitutional."); id. at 120 (statement of Professor Andreas
Lowenfeld, New York University) ("I don't think there is a constitutional requirement
for judicial review.").
After the agreement was ratified, three commentators reached a similar conclusion.
See Gordon A. Christenson & Kimberly Gambrel, Constitutionality of Binational Panel
Review in Canada-US. Free Trade Agreement 23 INr'L LAw. 401, 413-19 (1989); Huston,
supra note 35, at 546-49.
111. S. REP. No. 509, supra note 34, at 70, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2464
(additional views by Senators Dennis Deconcini and Howell T. Heflin). The House
Judiciary Committee did express a favorable opinion. See UimTn STATEsCANADA FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION Acr OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 4, at 2, 8-11 (1988).
112. See Hearing, supra note 36, at 165-93.
113. S. REP. No. 509, supra note 34, at 70-71, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CAN. 2395,
2464-66 (additional views by Senators Dennis Deconcini and Howell T. Heflin):
We believe, however, that the Agreement's creation of a binational panel
to replace the United States' long-established judicial review system raises such
serious policy and constitutional questions that.., we feel compelled to make
our views part of the record....
Many constitutional questions have been raised by constitutional scholars,
practicing attorneys, and bar/trade associations which, to date, have not been
answered to our satisfaction. Our founding fathers went to war to secure,
among other things, an independent judiciary....
[Me continue to have serious reservations about the wisdom and the
constitutionality of the creation of binational panels ....
Interestingly enough, Congress voiced similar concerns prior to enacting the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which the Supreme Court struck down in Northern Pipeline
See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 61 n.12(1982) (plurality opinion) (citing legislative history). For details on the Northern Pipe-
line decision, see supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
114. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified at scattered sections of 7, 8, 12, 19, 21, 28, 42 &
50 U.S.C. (1988)).
115. Constitutional challenges may be brought only before a special panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 19 U.S.CA. § 1516a(g) (4) (A)
(Supp. 1994). Other constitutional issues may be reviewed by a three-judge panel of
the Court of International Trade. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (4) (B) (1988).
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expanding the free trade area and its associated fora for antidumping and
subsidies actions.
Not surprisingly, the panel issue did not lay at rest for long. The
forum in which it arose, however, was a surprise. In Re Draft Treaty on a
European Economic Area,116 the European Court ofJustice confronted a sim-
ilar dispute resolution mechanism between the European Economic Com-
munity and the European Free Trade Area.
IM. The European Court's Decision
Like a government, a tribunate is weakened by the multiplication of its
members. When the tribunes of the Roman people... sought to double
their number, the Senate consented, confident that it could use some of
them to control the others, and that was precisely what happened.
-Jean-Jacques Rousseau 117
A. Background
The European Economic Community (EEC) is a well-known "single mar-
ket" comprised of twelve Western European nations1 18 and based upon
four fundamental freedoms: the free movement of goods, services, capi-
tal, and people among member countries. 119 The European Free Trade
Area (EFTA) is a smaller, lesser-known trading bloc consisting of seven
other Western European countries. 120 The EFTA began in 1960 as a sim-
ple free trade area but is virtually a single market today.121
In October 1991, following 14 months of negotiation, the EEC and
EFTA concluded an agreement on a "European Economic Area" or
"EEA."122 The EEA linked the two trading groups in a sort of hybrid
116. Draft Treaty I, supra note 3.
117. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract or Pindples of Political Righ, in THE
EssENTrI.L RoussEAu 1, 101 (Lowell Bair trans., 1974). Rousseau's tribunate performed
a function analogous to American judicial review. See id. at 100:
[Tihe tribunate, is the guardian of the laws and the legislative power....
The tribunate is not a constituent part of the republic and should have no
share in either the legislative or the executive power, but for that very reason its
own power is all the greater, for although it can do nothing, it can prevent
anything. It is more sacred and revered as the defender of the laws than the
prince that executes them or the sovereign that enacts them.
118. The EEC was founded in 1958 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands. Subsequently, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain,
and the United Kingdom enrolled as members. For a list and status of pending applica-
tions for Community membership, see Switzerland Joins the Queue, ECONOMIS, May 23,
1992, at 57.
119. See TREATY EsrABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNIIy [EEC TREATY]
art. 3.
120. The EFTA's member states are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland.
121. Neutral Against Whom?, ECONOMmST, July 11, 1992, at 18.
122. Lest a Fortress Arise, EcONOMIsT, Oct. 26, 1991, at 81. One publication described
the negotiations as a "delicate balancing act." Court Rules Against EEA Treaty, COMMON
MKr. REP., Jan. 9, 1992, at 1, 3 (now published as EC UPDATE).
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between a traditional free trade area and a single market. 123 The Commu-
nity's four freedoms-with notable exceptions not allowing free move-
ment of imports from non-EEA countries, or of agricultural goods-would
expand to the entire EEA.124 EFITA countries would adopt present and
future Community legislation into EFTA law.125 However, they would not
participate in the legislative process, except in a consultative capacity.126
In exchange for this limited voice in Community legislative functions,
the EFTA countries sought a more active role in the judicial process. 127
To this end, the agreement established a new "EEA Court" for the resolu-
tion of disputes.128 The EEA Court was to consist of eightjudges, with five
drawn from the European Community's Court ofJustice. 129 In rendering
decisions, the new court was "to pay due account to the principles laid
down" by other courts, such as the Court ofJustice, but was only bound to
follow those decisions issued prior to the date of the EEA agreement.' 30
Conversely, the Court ofJustice was also asked to consider EEA Court deci-
sions in interpreting the EEA Treaty.' 3 ' Further, local courts in the EFTA
member states could consult the Community Court for advisory opinions
on EEA interpretation.' 3 2
During the negotiation of the agreement, the Court of Justice
123. European Economic Area; A Short Shelf-hIfe ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 66. The
resulting trade area would have comprised 380 million consumers and 46% of world
trade. Lest a Fortress Arise, supra note 122, at 81. Subsequently, however, Swiss voters
decided not to ratify the agreement. Switzerland and the EC; The Difference, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 12, 1992, at 59.
Note that most of the individual EFTA countries had already had free trade agree-
ments with the EEC. Lest a Fortress Arise, supra note 122, at 81. Their objective injoining
the EEA was to extend these agreements, which were limited to goods, to cover services,
capital and labor. Id. The EFTA countries also had an eye to eventually joining the
Community as full-fledged members. European Economic Area; A Short Shelf-ife, supra, at
66.
For its part, the EEC gained greater access to its most significant trading partner. Lest
a Fortress Arise supra note 122, at 81. Critics contend that the EEC's main motive was to
delay or prevent EFTA members' applications for full Community membership. See
European Economic Area; A Short Shelf-life supra, at 66; see also Neutral Against Whom?, supra
note 121, at 18 (quoting Andreas Khol, director of the political academy of the Austrian
People's Party): "A cynic would say that Mr. Delors [EC Commission President] and his
commission have never wanted new members. That is why they invented the EEA. Now
they want to keep us in it like well-fed slaves."
124. EC and EFTA Agree on Creation of a European Economic Area, 4 Common Mkt Rep.
(CCH) 1 96,107, at 52,423-44; European Economic Area; A Short Shelf-Life, supra note 123,
at 66.
125. Draft Treaty I, supra note 3, at 267.
126. EC and EFTA Agree on Creation of a European Economic Area, supra note 124, at
52,424-45; Too Many Fiends, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1991, at 52.
127. Endless Elastic Arrangement, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1992, at 56.
128. Draft Treaty I, supra note 3, at 267.
129. Id. The Agreement also set up a lower court consisting of five judges: three
from the EFTA and two from the European Community's Court of First Instance. Id. at
267-68.
130. Id. at 267.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 268.
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expressed reservations about the EEA's dispute resolution mechanism.13 3
The negotiations proceeded, however, and when the EC Commission con-
cluded a draft agreement it asked the Court to assess the new judicial sys-
tem's compatibility with the EEC Treaty.TM
B. The Relevant Provisions of the EEC Treaty
Before reviewing the Court ofJustice's decision, a brief recap of the rele-
vant EEC Treaty provisions is in order. These provisions form an analogue
to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and provide a backdrop for the
Court's holding.
Article 4 of the Treaty establishes the Community Court, the Euro-
pean Court ofJustice, 135 while Article 164 defines its purpose: to "ensure
observance of law and justice in the interpretation and application of this
Treaty."136 The Court of Justice consists of thirteen judges,137 "chosen
from among persons of indisputable independence," who are qualified to
sit on the highest courts in their country or who are otherwise "jurists of a
recognized competence." 3 8 Judges are appointed by unanimous vote of
the Community's Member States, and serve six-year terms.139
In the interest of preserving the Court's "indisputable indepen-
dence," a protocol to the EEC Treaty sets forth several additional require-
ments. The protocol prohibits judges from "hold[ing] any political or
administrative office" or from "engag[ing] in any paid or unpaid profes-
sional activities." 140 Further, it articulates a set of detailed conflict-of-inter-
est provisions. t4 1 Perhaps most importantly, the Court protocol strictly
limits impeachment of judges: An individual judge can only be
impeached by a unanimous vote of the Court's remaining judges. 14 2
While the Community's detailed mechanisms for assuring judicial
independence differ from Article III's life tenure and compensation provi-
sions, there are key doctrinal similarities. Like the U.S. Constitution, Arti-
cles 4 and 164 of the EEC Treaty appear to contemplate an exclusive role
for the Community Court to interpret and apply the EEC Treaty. Further,
the Court ofJustice's Draft Treaty Iopinion made reference to institutional
and individual goals, similar to those embodied in the U.S. Constitution,
served by its exclusive role.' 43 Notably, however, the Court also recog-
133. Endless Elastic Arangement, supra note 127, at 56.
134. Draft Treaty I, supra note 3, at 266.
135. EEC TAnr art. 4. The Single European Act of 1985 amended the EEC Treaty
to allow for a Court of First Instance to be attached to the Court ofJustice. Id. art. 168A
(effective July 1, 1987).
136. Id. art. 164.
137. Id. art. 165 (as amended by Article 17 of the 1985 Act of Accession).
138. Id. art. 167.
139. Id.
140. EEC TamATv, Protocol of the Statute of the Court ofJustice, art. 4.
141. Id. art. 16.
142. Id. art. 6.
143. On Article 164's structural goals, the Court noted that the EEA dispute resolu-
tion mechanism not only violated Article 164 but "conflict[ed] ... with the very founda-
tions of the Community." Draft Treaty I, supra note 3, at 272. From a more individual
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nized that the Community's political institutions could deviate from the
strict letter of the Treaty and establish another court system through their
general legislative powers.144 This concession parallels the American doc-
trine of Article I tribunals. 145
C. The Court's Decision
Despite acknowledging the theoretical possibility of a new court system,
the Court of Justice invalidated the EEA's dispute resolution scheme on
three separate grounds. The first and primary basis was the substantial
overlap in subject matter jurisdiction between the existing court system
and the proposed new court. Because the EEA agreement embodied
many of the EEC Treaty's fundamental principles, such as free movement
of goods, and because it also incorporated Community legislation, the
EEA Court would be interpreting "an essential part of the rules... which
govern economic and trading relations within the Community and which
constitute, for the most part, fundamental provisions of the Community
legal order."146
This overlap carried great potential for harm. The EEA Court's inter-
pretations would inevitably differ from those of the Court ofJustice due to
two key differences between the EEA and EEC Treaties. First, the two trea-
ties differed in nature The EEA Treaty was an ordinary agreement
between sovereign entities, while "the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the
form of an international agreement, none the less constitutes the constitu-
tional charter of a Community based on the rule of law."147 Second, the
treaties differed in purpose The EEA Treaty sought economic freedoms as
ends in themselves, while the EEC Treaty seeks those freedoms as mere
means to the broader goals of European economic, monetary, and polit-
ical unity.148 And because the EEA Agreement did not compel the EEA
Court to follow its Community counterpart,1 49 the Agreement's differing
nature and goals would "introduc[e] into the Community legal order a
large body of legal rules which [would be] juxtaposed to a corpus of identi-
cally-worded Community rules."150 The Court concluded that the new
perspective, the Court cited "the confidence which individuals are entitled to have in
the ability of the Court ofJustice to carry out its functions in complete independence."
Id. at 273.
144. The Court also noted:
An international agreement providing for such a system of courts is in principle
compatible with Community law. The Community's competence in the field of
international relations and its capacity to conclude international agreements
necessarily entails the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is cre-
ated or designed by such an agreement as regards the interpretation and appli-
cation of its provisions.
I& at 271.
145. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
146. Draft Treaty I, supra note 3, at 271.
147. Id. at 268-69.
148. Id. at 268.
149. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
150. Draft Treaty I, supra note 3, at 245.
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body of law would eventually contaminate existing Community law, and
therefore "conflict[ed] with Article 164 of the EEC Treaty and, more gen-
erally, with the very foundations of the Community."151
The Court's second concern was that some of its own judges would sit
on the EEA tribunal.15 2 In its opinion, this accentuated the danger of
spillover between EEA and EEC case law.153 Moreover, by making Com-
munity judges serve two masters, the EEA and the EEC, the Agreement
would undermine judicial independence.' 5 4
Finally, the Court ofJustice objected to the fact that, under the new
system, it would be issuing advisory opinions to local courts in the
EFTA. 15 5 This, it declared, "would change the nature of the function of
the Court ofJustice as it is conceived by the EEC Treaty, namely that of a
court whose judgments are binding."15 6 Indeed, the Court feared that
taking on an advisory role in some cases might lead Community members
to question the binding character of its regular decisions.1
57
The Court's emphatic decision sent the EEC and EFTA back to the
drawing board. The two blocs hammered out a revised EEA Agreement,
which abolished the EEA Court and gave the Court ofJustice sole jurisdic-
tion over EEA disputes whose resolution required interpretation of terms
contained in Community law.15 8 The Community Court gave its bless-
ing,159 and the final agreement was signed on May 6, 1992, in Portugal.
160
IV. Article HI Revisited
Communications and commerce are global; investment is mobile; tech-
nology is almost magical; and ambition for a better life is now universal. We
earn our livelihood in America today in peaceful competition with people
all across the Earth.
Profound and powerful forces are shaking and remaking our world,
and the urgent question of our time is whether we can make change our
friend and not our enemy.
-President Bill Clinton 161
151. Id. at 271-72.
152. Id. at 272-73.
153. Id. at 272.
154. Id. at 273.
155. Id. at 273-74.
156. Id. at 274.
157. Id.
158. Case 1/92, Re Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area (No. 2) 2 C.M.L.R.
217, 237 (1992) [hereinafter Draft Treaty fl]. The new agreement did set up an "EFTA
Court" to hear cases in EFTA countries. Id- at 236. It also established ajoint Commit-
tee to monitor the case law of the EFTA and EEC Courts and "to act so as to preserve
the homogeneous interpretation of the agreement." Id, However, the Committee
could not affect or disregard Court of Justice case law: a condition that the Court
viewed as "indispensable." Id. at 238-39.
159. See id at 241.
160. Favourable ECJ Opinion Enables Signature of EEA Agreement COMMON MKir. REP.,
June 25, 1992, at 5 (now published as EC UPDATE).
161. President William Jefferson Clinton, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1993), in S.F.
CHRoN.,Jan. 21, 1993, at A12.
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At first, one might dismiss the Draft Treaty I decision as the product of a
foreign legal system with no binding precedential value for U.S. courts.
However, this view would ignore the similarities between the American
and European judiciary doctrines, and the common policy concerns each
doctrine expresses.162 Indeed, an American court, reviewing the EEA
agreement for compliance with Article III, would probably reach the same
result.
A brief application of the Schor test1 63 to the original EEA agreement
demonstrates this assertion. By creating a new court to interpret a large
body of Community legal terms, the agreement would heavily intrude
upon traditional judicial functions and jurisdiction, the first Schor factor.
Second, as the new court would also be interpreting the EEC Treaty's fun-
damental freedoms, it would clearly be adjudicating important individual
rights. The third Schor factor, the reasons for departing from Article III,
would weigh in favor of the agreement, as the Community's interest in
free trade with the EFTA and its investment in the associated lengthy
negotiations were both high. Given, however, that the Northern Pipeline
Court was willing to undo Congress's ten-year revision of bankruptcy law
to preserve Article III jurisdiction over a small subset of common law
claims,'6 the European Court's unwillingness to accept the Community's
justification should come as no surprise.
Conversely, one cannot ignore that the dangers that animated the
Draft Treaty Idecision are also present in NAFTA. The Community Court's
primary concern was with the "spillover" of jurisprudence between itself
and the new court. This sort of contamination is also possible under
NAFrA, as Article III courts continue to adjudicate claims against non-
NAFTA exporters (and those NAFTA exporters who do not elect panel
review) while non-Article I panels assess similar claims under NAFTA.165
In fact, NAFTA encourages U.S. courts to seek guidance from panel opin-
ions.1 66 As in Europe, the danger of spillover is heightened because Arti-
cle III judges will serve as panelists.' 67 Finally, just as the Community
162. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
165. See S. REP. No. 509, supra note 34, at 71, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2465
(additional views by Senators Dennis Deconcini and Howell T. Heflin): "This parallel
system could lead to the development of disparate jurisprudence between the panel
and [the Court of International Trade] and also between one panel and another."
166. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (3) (1988) (implementing statute for U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement); North American Free Trade Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182, § 411(2), 107 Stat. 2057, 2141 (1993); see also Hearing, supra note 36, at 122 (state-
ment of Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, New York University) ("I think one can look
forward to gradual harmonization of the perceptions and practices of the two nations as
the body of precedent builds up in the decisions of the binational panels"). Professor
Lowenfeld then declared: "I would hope, in fact, that U.S. courts in cases not covered
by the panel would-and I think the legislation ought to say "should"-look at the
recent opinions of the panels." Id.
167. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, who supported the binational panel mechanism in the
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, roundly criticized this provision. "As a constitu-
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Court would have been rendering advisory opinions to EFTA countries
under the EEA agreement, American Article III judges serving on bina-
tional panels will be issuing advisory opinions on statutory
amendments.' 68
Moreover, the procedural background to facilitate an Article Ill chal-
lenge to the panel system is already firmly in place. Picture the following
scenario: a U.S. firm obtains a favorable determination from the U.S.
trade agencies on an antidumping or countervailing duty complaint
against Canadian exporters. Its opponent appeals, but requests that the
hearing take place before a binational panel. The U.S. firm bides its time,
hoping for the best, but loses on appeal. At this point, the disgruntled
domestic company challenges the binational panel's constitutionality
under Article I. This issue would not go before a panel, but instead to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.16 9 Further, the Canadian
exporter would not be able to argue that its opponent failed to raise its
objection at the panel hearing: The alleged Article III violation is a struc-
tural defect that private litigants cannot waive.17
0
In light of these facts, the better approach would be to examine
NAFICA in light of the European Court's decision, and to determine
whether NAFrA and the EEA treaty are similar enough that the European
case may offer pivotal guidance, or whether their differences are sufficient
tional matter, it might well be improper for Article III judges ... to carry out some
kinds of non-Article II functions, such as giving what are in effect binding rulings on
Canadian law under Article 1904, and giving in effect advisory opinions on United
States law under [the amendment review process]." Hearing, supra note 36, at 148. Rep-
resentatives of the American Bar Association noted that the use of sitting federal judges
may violate the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which prohibits judges from
acting as arbitrators. I&. at 222 (statement of Stewart Abercrombie Baker and Jeffrey
Philip Bialos on behalf of American Bar Association).
168. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text; see also supra note 167 (describing
Professor Andreas Lowenfeld's opposition to use of federal judges as panelists).
The Americanjudiciary's aversion to advisory opinions predates Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Letter from ChiefJusticeJohnJay and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court to President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) in PAUL
M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WEcHsLER's TE FEDERAL CouRrs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
66-67 (3d ed. 1988):
We have considered the previous question stated in a letter written by your
direction to us by the Secretary of State [Thomas Jefferson] on the 18th of last
month, [regarding] the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between
the three departments of the government. These being in certain respects
checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort, are
considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our
extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to, especially as the power given
by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for
opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive
departments.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has allowed federal courts to render such opinions
in carefully circumscribed situations. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 582-83
(1962) (plurality opinion) (allowing Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals to issue advisory opinions where such opinions constituted a trivial percentage
of those courts' business).
169. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 79.
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to allow for different results. Accordingly, this Part uses the EEA decision
as a springboard for examining NAFTA and the Schor test in detail.
A. Encroachment on Judicial Powers
The first Schorfactor weighs the congressional intrusion on judicial power
from an institutional perspective, assessing the impact on Article III
courts. This analysis consists of two separate issues: the extent to which
the new forum exercises traditional judicial functions, and the extent to
which that forum decides cases traditionally heard by Article III courts.
1. Exercise ofJudicial Functions
As a given tribunal possesses more of the "essential attributes of judicial
power" its encroachment on Article I courts becomes more signifi-
cant.1 71 In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court invalidated a scheme
under which Congress granted Article I bankruptcy judges a bevy of court-
like powers, including the ability to issue various writs and to conduct jury
trials.17 2 By contrast, the Schor Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) over common law counter-
claims, because the CFTC "hew[ed] closely" to the traditional model of
administrative agencies.173 The CFTC, unable to enforce its own orders,
had to rely on district courts to issue them.174 Litigants could appeal to a
federal court, which reviewed CFTC factual findings under a "weight of
the evidence" standard, and subjected its legal determinations to de novo
review.175
Under this framework, the NAFTA panels wield a great deal of judi-
cial power. Like a traditional appellate court, these tribunals will entertain
motions, review briefs, and hear oral arguments.' 76 In fact, their rules are
to be "based... [up]on judicial rules of appellate procedure."17 7 Their
decisions, written in the style of judicial opinions, bind parties without
need for judicial assistance.17 8 Unlike Schor, parties to a dispute cannot
appeal to federal court; rather, they must appeal to another level of Article
I tribunals, the extraordinary challenge committees. 17 9 Indeed, the U.S.
Department of Commerce's chief counsel for international trade lauded
the panel scheme as "a very careful court-like process, with panelists acting
171. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
172. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55
(1982) (plurality opinion). The Northern Pipeline plurality did not employ the balancing
test, later adopted in Schor, which in fact originated withJustice White's Northern Pipeline
dissent. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the Schor Court
explicitly incorporated this aspect of the Northern Pipeline opinion. See Schor, 478 U.S. at
852-53.
173. Schor, 478 U.S. at 852.
174. Id. at 853.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
177. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1904 § 14.
178. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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very much like judges."180
2. TraditionalJudicialJurisdiction
Article I tribunals can also invade the judicial function by hearing* cases
traditionally reserved for Article I courts. 18 1 Historically, Article I
courts have adjudicated antidumping and subsidies cases, along with trade
disputes in general. As early as 1878, federal courts held jurisdiction over
customs contests.182 In 1909, Congress transferred these cases to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the precursor to today's
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.' 8 3 Subsequently, in Exparte Bake-
lite Corp.,'8 4 the Supreme Court held that the CCPA was not an Article I
Court. Commentators of the time criticized the Bakelite decision, 18 5 and
CCPA judges "never accepted the dependent status thrust at them."' 86
Congress then declared that the CCPA was an Article III court, and the
Supreme Court acquiesced in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.'8 7 In light of this
history, even those commentators who support NAFTA's constitutionality
concede that the historical resolution of trade disputes in Article III courts
argues against the transfer of such disputes to binational panels.' 8 8
B. Nature and Importance of Rights Adjudicated
The previous Schor factor dealt with the institutional ramifications of a
congressional departure from Article I. But as we have already seen,
Article III promotes individual rights as well.' 8 9 Accordingly, the next
branch of the Schor test assesses the nature and importance of individual
rights transferred to an Article I tribunal.
1. Nature
This analysis incorporates the "public rights" doctrine that the Northern
180. Hearing, supra note 36, at 96 (statement of Ms. M.Jean Anderson, Chief Counsel
for International Trade); see also id. at 94-95 (statement of Ambassador Alan F. Holmer,
Deputy U.S. Trade Representative) ("[T]his binational panel... will come to be per-
ceived as being an objective, impartial body that will make determinations the way
courts presently make [them].").
181. Schor, 478 U.S. at 854.
182. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 574-75 (1962) (plurality opinion).
183. See idi
184. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
185. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 543.
186. Id. at 584.
187. 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (plurality opinion). The plurality criticized Bakelite but
found it unnecessary to explicitly overrule it. As long as trade cases could be heard in
Article IH courts, the plurality argued Congress could choose to assign them to such
courts. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 549-50. Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren con-
curred in the result, but found the plurality's critique of Bakelite unnecessary and
unwarranted. See id. at 585-89 (Clark, J., concurring).
188. See Christenson & Gambrel, supra note 110, at 419; Huston, supra note 35, at
549.
189. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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Pipeline plurality attempted to employ as a bright-line test.190 A public
right is an individual's right to sue the government rather than private
citizens. Technically, an antidumping or subsidy appeal is a suit brought
against the government agency that rendered a final determination.
191
Practically, though, the underlying action is a suit against a foreign
exporter.' 9 2 At any rate, the Bakelite Court held that trade suits are public
rights;193 unless the Supreme Court overrules itself on this issue, the pub-
lic rights factor will favor NAFTA.
2. Importance
Proponents of binational dispute resolution often observe that an individ-
ual's interest in foreign trade is not important enough to require Article
HI adjudication. 19 4 After all, commercial interests do not enjoy constitu-
tional protection, 195 and the judiciary has historically shown great defer-
ence to the political branches of government on matters affecting foreign
policy.196
190. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57-74 (plurality opinion). See supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
191. See Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929). Title 28 of the U.S. Code
classifies antidumping and countervailing duty actions as "[c]ivil actions against the
United States and agencies and officers thereof." See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1988).
192. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 588-89 (1985).
193. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 458.
194. See, eg., Hearing, supra note 36, at 83 n.4 (testimony ofJohn 0. McGinnis, Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General) ("Because individuals do not enjoy a vested constitu-
tional 'right to import,' Congress may preclude judicial review of administrative
determinations. .... ).
195. See id. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933),
represents a particularly striking example of this view. There, an importer challenged a
tariff, designed to equalize production costs between the United States and Norway,
assessed on Norwegian sodium nitrite. Id. at 297. The importer argued that it had not
received a proper hearing before the U.S. Tariff Commission. Id. Writing for the
Supreme Court, Justice Cardozo rejected this due process claim, proclaiming. "No one
has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty." Id. at 318; see also
Border Brokerage Co. v. United States, 646 F.2d 539, 547 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J.,
concurring) (upholding constitutionality of statute that deemed tie votes in Interna-
tional Trade Commission proceedings to be affirmative findings, because economic leg-
islation does not infringe fundamental rights); Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de
Lorraine v. United States, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 280, 287 (1985) (denying due process claim
related to Commerce Department's refusal to allow additional imports of steel pipes
from European Economic Community), vacated on other grounds, 815 F.2d 1488 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987): "Furthermore, there is no generally available,
protectable interest to engage in foreign trade."
196. See Hearing, supra note 36, at 115 (statement of Professor Harold H. Bruff, Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin) ("[I]f the FFA's replacement ofjudidal review occurred in a
purely domestic scheme, I do not think it would survive."); id. at 109 (statement of
Professor Harold H. Bruff, University of Texas at Austin):
[E]ach duty dispute has implications for international trade relations. Indeed,
privately initiated duty disputes have proven their capacity to affect and embar-
rass trade negotiations between Canada and the United States.... I think
American courts would hold that the national interest in smoothing interna-
tional trade relations subordinates private interests in particular domestic judi-
cial review procedures.
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At first glance, this might appear to be a key distinction between
NAFTA and the EEA system invalidated by the Court of Justice. One
might argue that trade issues, as the foundations of the European Com-
munity, achieve near-constitutional status there. Such an argument suffers
from three flaws. First, it overstates the European Court's position: The
European Community does not exalt commercial interests to any constitu-
tional level. 1 9 7 Second, it may overstate the American judiciary's defer-
ence in the foreign policy context. In cases involving interpretation of
federal trade law, the Supreme Court has employed a hands-on
approach. 198
Most importantly, though, panel supporters underemphasize the
legal importance of foreign trade to the United States. International com-
merce is no longer the province of a few specialized traders; rather, many
industries compete in a world market. Trade disputes have gone beyond
customs classifications and tariff rates, and now center on complex-and
controversial-legal and social issues. One need look no further than the
recent Congressional debates over NAFIA for examples of this transfor-
mation. Several NAFITA critics contended that Mexico's relatively low
working standards and wage scales, and its allegedly lax enforcement of
environmental laws, provide unfair advantages in attracting U.S. invest-
ment and employment.199 One commentator went so far as to downplay
"Mexican sovereignty" and assert that "an agreement on freeing the flow
197. See, e.g., Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 508, 2 C.M.L.R. 338,
355 (1974): "As regards the [constitutional] guarantees accorded to a particular under-
taking, they can in no respect be extended to protect mere commercial interests or
opportunities, the uncertainties of which are part of the very essence of economic
activity."
198. SeeJapan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986). In
Japan Whaling, the Court held that the Secretary of State's failure to impose sanctions
on Japanese whalers, pursuant to federal statute, for violating an international whaling
convention, was justiciable and not a "political question." The Court declared: "[N]ot
every matter touching on politics is a political question, and ... it is 'error to suppose
that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cog-
nizance.'" Id. at 229-30 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1969)) (citation
omitted). Rather, the case boiled down to interpreting the sanction statute, and in the
Court's words, "it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a
recurring and accepted task for the federal courts." Id. at 230.
The Court of International Trade recently held that the Administrative Procedures
Act creates a right of judicial review of countervailing duty determinations. Philipp
Bros., Inc. v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 76 (1986). The Philipp court observed
that "[i]n the area of international trade, agency and executive determinations have
generally been found to be nonreviewable... only in areas where there truly is no law
to apply such as the 'multifaceted judgmental decision to settle a claim' and in those
areas fraught with foreign affairs considerations." Id. at 85 (citation omitted).
199. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. H9,864-H9,869 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Kaptur); see also id. at H9, 865:
Countries with a commitment to democracy building and the best products-
not the most exploited workers or the best special deals-should get our atten-
tion. Any trade agreement the U.S. signs must acknowledge this new global
climate and fxlly address the social, political, as well as economic, dimensions
of trade-related growth. To do less will harm our own people and fail to hold
other nations to the lofty goals our own liberty commands.
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of goods, services and capital will succeed only if it is linked to the larger
social issues that divide the continent."20 0
NAFTA is also important as an illustration of a broader trend. Many
nations have formed trading blocs, recognizing that transnational institu-
tions, with the attendant sacrifice of some national sovereignty, are neces-
sary to reach solutions to today's complex and divisive trade issues.20 1
Indeed, many U.S. policymakers hope to eventually extend NAFTA to all
of Latin America.20 2 It comes as no surprise that the European Court of
Justice, itself a transnational institution, refused to be left behind on this
journey and invalidated the European Economic Area agreement.203
With NAFTA's system for transnational adjudication, the United States
now confronts the same issue. Thus, trade issues are no less important to
America than to the European Community- The Community uses free
trade as a means to transnational political ends, while NAFTA uses trans-
national political institutions to attain free trade.
One author views the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline,
which invalidated a congressional allocation of certain common law claims
to Article I bankruptcy judges,20 4 as a means to retain Article III purview
over a legal context that would eventually emerge as a hotbed of far-reach-
ing social issues.20 5 If so, trade law is a strong candidate over which the
Supreme Court may assert Article III jurisdiction.
C. Congressional Interest in Departing from Article III
Under the Schor test, the Supreme Court balances the congressional intru-
sion into Article Ijurisdiction, as measured from both institutional and
individual perspectives described above, against the congressional interest
served by that intrusion. Advocates of the binational panel system use this
interest as the focal point of NAFTA's constitutionality, arguing that panel
review enables the United States to realize the economic and social bene-
fits of free trade with its neighbors. 20 6
200. Karin Lissakers, Why Clinton is Right on NAFTA, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1992, at
A15.
201. Transnationalism represents a modem answer to the Riddle of the Sphinx:
What walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at midday, and three legs in the
evening? Nations that previously struggled for political independence are now recog-
nizing their economic interdependence, using transnational institutions as a sort of
"third leg," a compromise between maintaining full sovereignty and having none at all.
202. See Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-532, § 5,
106 Stat. 3509, 3512 (authorizing Presidential study of hemispheric trade zone); see also
Bob Davis, One America: The North American Free-Trade Pact May Be Just the First Step
Toward a Hemispheric B0c, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at R1, R8 (noting that Chile
appears to be first in line).
203. See supra notes 118-60 and accompanying text for discussion of the European
Court's decision.
204. For a complete analysis of this case, see supra notes 90-104 and accompanying
text.
205. SeeJudith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article 1, 56 U. CoLo. L. Rxv. 581, 615
(1985).
206. See, e.g., Christenson & Gambrel, supra note 110, at 418; Huston, supra note 35,
at 551.
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Upon closer scrutiny, however, the concededly strong economic and
social interests in free trade provide only dubious legal support for the
panel system. Congress has justified prior departures from Article I on
either of two grounds: (1) reducing backlog in Article III courts,2 0 7 or (2)
creating Article I courts in highly specialized areas to develop expertise.2 0 8
In other words, the purported congressional interest servedjudicial interests
as welL
Neither the reduced-backlog nor the specialized-expertise justifica-
tion seems very strong here. United States trade law already contains
detailed timetables to promote speedy resolution of antidumping and sub-
sidies cases,20 9 and assigns those cases to the specialized Court of Interna-
tional Trade.2 10
Alternatively, one could cite a congressional interest in assigning international dis-
putes to international tribunals. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the
Supreme Court upheld an executive agreement that settled the "Iran hostage crisis"
and suspended American claims against Iran for submission to an international claims
tribunal. The Court has not extended Dames & Moore beyond its unique context of
suspending claims against a foreign government to defuse an international crisis. In
fact, the Dames & Moore Court took great pains to limit its holding and to avoid
announcing any general principles. SeeDames & Moore 453 U.S. at 660-61; see also id. at
688 (quoting Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800,
814 (1st Cir. 1981)):
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims,
even as against foreign governmental entities. As the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit stressed, "[the] sheer magnitude of such a power, considered
against the background of the diversity and complexity of modem international
trade, cautions against any broader construction of authority than is necessary."
See also Louis HENN3N, FOREIGN AFFAIs AND THE CONsTrurtoN 197 (1972) (noting that
current international tribunals do not pose a problem under Article III because such
bodies "decide cases or controversies between nation-states" and not between private
individuals).
The interest in international resolution of international issues is a valid one. How-
ever, it might best be served by an amendment to Article Ill rather than resort to the
case-by-case uncertainty of the Sdr test. See infra text following note 225.
207. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2668 (1991) (upholding use of
magistrates to conduct voir dire, in order "to relieve the district courts of certain
subordinate duties that often distract [them] from more important matters"); Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 n.40 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (citing need to adjudicate bankruptcy-related claims in a single forum and "to
avoid the delay and expense of jurisdictional disputes"); id. at 117 (White, J., dissent-
ing) ("The stresses placed upon the old bankruptcy system by the tremendous increase
in bankruptcy cases were well documented .... ."); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389, 408 (1973) (approving creation of Article I courts in District of Columbia to
address judicial "crisis" there); cf. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 572-73, 575 (1985) (upholding use of alternative dispute resolution to reduce
"logjam" of disputes at Environmental Protection Agency).
208. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855-56
(1986) (acknowledging CFTC's "obvious expertise" in handling reparations suits);
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590 (describing arbitration as "prompt, continuous, expert and
inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact"); Northern Pipeine, 458
U.S. at 117 (WhiteJ., dissenting) ("I do not believe it is possible to challenge Congress'
further determination that it was necessary to create a specialized court to deal with
bankruptcy matters.").
209. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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In fact, the congressional interest in binational panels is very different
from the interests the Supreme Court has previously recognized. Far from
serving the judiciary, the panel scheme represents a bold assault on Article
I courts, designed to affect substantive changes in legal interpretation.
Canadian officials were dissatisfied with the results they received under
U.S. law.2 11 Congress, with the constitutional ability to change the sub-
stance of that law, chose instead to change the forum that would interpret
the law. To achieve political ends, Congress pulled trade cases from the
Article III courts and created a reconstituted version of the U.S. judiciary,
in which litigants would pick and choose among U.S. judges, lawyers, lay-
men, and their Canadian and Mexican counterparts. It is difficult to con-
ceive any real-life situation closer to the quintessential Article III violation.
D. Weighing the Balance
As with any complex judicial balancing test, there can be no certainty of
Article III's ultimate verdict on the binational panel system. No simple
scorecard can guide or predict a judicial opinion. Yet the European
Court's decision provides useful insight as to how this Gordian knot
might-and should-unravel. The NATA approach sets too dangerous a
precedent, in too sensitive an area of law, for too wrong a reason. The
U.S. Supreme Court should take a cue from its European cousin and inval-
idate the panel mechanism.
V. Aftermath
Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it
is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.
-Winston Churchill212
Invalidating binational dispute resolution would leave gaping short-term
and long-term holes. In the short term, the NAFTA countries must work
to salvage their economic pact. In the long term, the United States must
make a decision on the broader issues of national sovereignty and
transnationalism.
NAFTA itself sets forth a contingency plan to address the short-run
concern. In the event that its panel system fails a constitutional test,
NAFTA's failsafe provision would come into play. This provision declares
that if one country's domestic law obstructs the panel system, either of its
NAFTA partners may request consultations on the matter.213 If the matter
has not been resolved within forty-five days of that request, or within such
other period as the consulting parties agree, then the complaining coun-
try can request review by an extraordinary challenge committee.2 14 If that
211. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
212. Winston Churchill, Speech at the Lord Mayor's Day Luncheon (Nov. 10, 1942)
quoted inJoHN BARTLtt, F~mLjA QuoTATIONs 621 (No. 12) (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th
ed. 1992).
213. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1905 § 1.
214. Id. art. 1905 §§ 2-5.
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committee agrees that obstruction has occurred, a sixty-day consultation
period begins when the committee issues its report. 215 If this second
round of negotiations fails, the complaining country may in turn suspend
its participation in the panel system or withhold other NAFTA benefits
from the obstructing country.2 16
Given NAFTA's implications for foreign policy, and the significant
investment each of its member countries has made in the agreement, the
invalidating court might isstie a stay, along the lines of Northern Pipeline,2 17
to accommodate the NAFTA consultation procedure. During that window
of opportunity, the United States could work with its co-signatories to con-
form the panel system to Article III.
NAFTA's most egregious violation, the use of sitting U.S. judges as
panelists, should be stricken entirely. Beyond this, some tinkering may be
sufficient to pass the Schor test. Two measures with some recent success in
this regard come to mind. First, the revised plan should give parties some
right of appeal from panel decisions to Article I courts, perhaps by
replacing the extraordinary challenge committees with U.S. appellate
courts. The existence of such appellate review was one factor cited by the
Schor Court in upholding the Commodity Exchange Act. 2 1 8 A second sen-
sible modification would allow courts to review the panel's interpretations
of U.S. non-trade laws, e.g., environmental laws, under a de novo standard.
Congress took a similar tack in amending the bankruptcy laws after North-
ern Pipeline.21 9 Hopefully, negotiators might glean further amendment
ideas from the invalidating court's opinion.
Unfortunately, there are no ready-made provisions for making the
more crucial long-term decision: how to reconcile the sacrifice of power
to transnational institutions with our sovereign system of government. In
light of today's global markets and economic interdependence, isolation-
ism does not seem a palatable, or even viable, option. Transnational eco-
nomic disputes require transnational resolution at the political and
judicial levels. The European Community was only the first example of
this phenomenon; NAFTA is only the most recent.
Tribunals, like the NAFTA panels, are a rapidly growing trend. The
parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 2 20
recently agreed to establish a system of binding dispute resolution by
215. Id. art. 1905 § 7.
216. Id. art. 1905 § 8.
217. See supra text accompanying note 100. The Northern Pipeline Court also limited
its decision to prospective application. See supra text accompanying note 100. Since
Northern Pipeline, however, the Supreme Court has sharply curtailed the practice of non-
retrospective decisionmaking. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510,
2519 (1993).
218. See supra text accompanying note 175. The Northern Pipeline plurality, which
took a less flexible view of things, found that appellate review was irrelevant. Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n.39.
219. See supra note 100.
220. See supra note 67.
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panels selected from GATI members, 22 1 to be administered by a new
"multilateral trade organization."222 Ironically, GATT was intended to be
a transnational organization from its inception in 1947.223 The United
States balked at the proposal because of sovereignty concerns, and GATT
became an agreement rather than an institution. 224
Today, the United States faces the same transnational choice it
rejected in 1947. Article III of the Constitution ensures that the decision
will be an appropriately careful one. We must confront the sacrifice of
sovereignty head on: If we are to have transnational adjudication, we must
amend Article III to incorporate and govern that choice.
Moreover, an amendment to Article I is desirable in a pragmatic
sense, as the best means towards the worthy goals of transnational adjudi-
cation. A crucial ingredient of any international agreement is legal cer-
tainty: All parties must be assured in advance that the agreement's
provisions are legally enforceable; otherwise, the associated negotiations
could become meaningless. Thus, the Senate Judiciary Committee held
hearings on the constitutionality of the panel system before enacting the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, and the European Commission
sought advance judicial approval of its draft EEA agreement. A clear and
specially tailored Article I will provide America's trading partners with
more legal certainty than the current case-by-case balancing of the Schor
test.
The new Article Ill should define what issues can be subject to trans-
national adjudication; who will appoint American members of transna-
tional tribunals; where those members will come from; and how the new
courts will interact with our existing judicial system. Ideally, our transna-
tionaljudges should enjoy tenure and compensation safeguards analogous
to those that currently assure judicial independence. 225
At the same time, we might amend the Constitution's treaty provi-
sions to define when and how Congress can provide for these new transna-
tional bodies. Before joining the European Economic Area, voters in the
European Free Trade Association had to ratify the EEA Agreement. The
United States should consider giving its citizens the same choice.
As it currently stands, NAFIA's plan for binational dispute resolution
challenges the role of Article I courts. The Article III balance is a diffi-
cult and not entirely predictable one, but the European Court ofJustice's
decision in a similar case suggests that the balance may tilt against NAFTA.
221. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, 11 3.1-3.12, 8.1 ("Understanding on Rules and Pro-
cedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes").
222. See id.
223. BARToN & FIsHER, supra note 17, at 91-92. A contemporary observer theorized
that the proposed international trade organization would submit trade disputes to the
United Nations' International Court of ustice for resolution. Grant Gilmore, 77w Inter-
national Court ofJustic; 55 YAu I.J. 1049, 1066 (1946).
224. BARTON & FisHER, supra note 17, at 92.
225. A proposed amendment to Article III appears in the Appendix.
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However, NAMTA is not the end of Article m, nor is Article III the end of
NAFA. They are, perhaps, only the beginning.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE m
[Sections 1-3 would remain unchanged.]
SECTION 4. Pursuant to Treaty, Congress may vest the judicial
Power of the United States, in regards to Cases and Controversies arising
under Treaties or laws of foreign commerce, in such international Tribu-
nals as Congress may ordain.
The Judges of such Tribunals shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour throughout the term of the related Treaty or Agreement.
Their Compensation shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
Judges selected by the United States to serve on international Tribu-
nals shall be appointed by the President, with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.
With respect to the interpretation of United States domestic law, and
of this Constitution, the decisions of international Tribunals shall be sub-
ject to plenary appellate review by the federal Courts. Interpretations of
the law of foreign commerce, and findings of fact, shall be subject to
review for manifest error.
Nothing in this Provision shall be construed to limit the power of
Congress to assign such Cases and Controversies to the federal Courts.
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